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Abstract
This paper studies the international portfolio ﬂo w so fU Si n v e s t o r st oe x a m i n e
the information structure of international equity markets. We use an empirical
model of portfolio ﬂows with both public and private information to extract mea-
sures of trades due to private information. We ﬁnd that such trades are highly
correlated across countries. In particular, a common “global” factor accounts for
about half of the variation in trades due to private information. We show that the
global factor helps explain the cross section of international equity returns, after
controlling for public information. The ﬁnding that a substantial portion of trades
due to private information across countries contains the same common informa-
tion challenges the conventional view that domestic investors have better private
information about their home market than foreign investors.
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A common view of international equity markets holds that domestic investors have private
information about their home market that is not available to foreign investors. This
“local” private information is believed to originate from superior knowledge of domestic
ﬁrms or country-speciﬁc economic conditions. The conventional view is motivated by
evidence on portfolio holdings, particularly the “home bias” phenomenon.1 There is
also some evidence that local investors make higher average trading proﬁts than foreign
investors. For example, Shukla and van Inwegen (1995) provide evidence that US mutual
fund managers performed better than UK fund managers in investing in US stocks. Hau
(2001) shows foreign traders have lower proﬁts than their German counterparts when
investing in German stocks. Choe, Kho and Stulz (2001) ﬁnd a small informational
advantage for local individual investors in Korea. In addition, Timmermann and Blake
(2002) show that UK fund managers lost money from trying to time a number of foreign
markets.
However, the conventional view has recently been challenged by other studies that
suggest that foreign investors may actually outperform their domestic counterparts. Grin-
blatt and Keloharju (2000) and Karolyi (1999) focus on average trading proﬁts in Fin-
land and Japan, respectively, and ﬁnd that foreign investors outperform local investors.
Hamao and Mei (2001) ﬁnd that foreign investors display market timing ability in Japan
in the early (1974-1980) part of their data. Seasholes (2000) and Bailey, Mao, and
Sirodom (2002) study trading around earnings announcements in Taiwan and Singapore
and Thailand, respectively. They ﬁnd that foreign investors tend to accumulate (sell)
assets before the arrival of good (bad) news on the stocks. Finally, Froot and Ramadorai
(2001) ﬁnd that equity ﬂows into 25 developed and emerging countries forecast both
net asset values and NYSE prices of closed-end country funds, which they interpret as
evidence that foreign investors have better information. All of these new ﬁndings are
puzzling under the conventional view: it is hard to see why foreigners should have sys-
tematically better information about local ﬁrms.
This paper proposes a new perspective on private information that can address the
puzzle raised by the recent ﬁndings. The key point is the existence of “global” private
information which is relevant for trading in many foreign countries simultaneously. As
one example, consider market research about the technology sector. Insights about the
1 Home bias refers to the fact that the level of international portfolio investment is well below that
suggested by models of international diversiﬁcation (see Lewis, 1999, for a survey). In addition, foreign
investors tend to hold those domestic securities that are more familiar to them. See, for example, Kang
and Stulz (1997), Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999), Dahlquist and Robertson (2001), and Ahearne, Griever,
and Warnock (2001). For a survey on international capital ﬂows and returns see Stulz (1999).
1future of this sector in the US are likely to be important for the valuation of tech stocks
in Europe as well. Thus, experience gained in the US market may give sophisticated US
investors an advantage in recognizing global trends in technology. In this case, trades
based on such global private information would help US investors outperform domestic
investors in Europe.
The goal of the present paper is to explore whether global private information is
important in international equity markets and whether US investors trade on it. We ﬁrst
propose measures of trades due to private information by US investors in eight developed
country stock markets. We then focus on the correlation of US investors’ trades due
to private information across the diﬀerent markets. If most private information were
local, then this correlation should be low. For example, private information generated by
market research about France that leads sophisticated US investors to purchase French
equities should not help forecast returns in Germany, and therefore should not entail
purchases of German equities. In contrast, the more private information is global, the
higher the cross-country correlation of trades due to private information.
Our main result is that a global factor accounts for approximately half of the variation
in trades due to private information.2 This common factor is useful for forecasting returns
in many countries and has an economically large impact on realized return variation. Our
results thus imply that global private information plays an important role in the dynamics
of international equity ﬂows and returns. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
time that common private information has been shown to exist in international markets.3
The fact that global information matters for US investors is particularly intuitive,
because information that is local for US investors is also global information. The sizeable
volume of international trade and foreign direct investment originated in the US makes
the US one of the largest trading partners for countries around the globe. In addition
to international links at the sector or ﬁrm level, common (i.e. global) factors in business
cycles could also be a source of correlated private information.4 It is thus not implausible
that private information signals on US equities also have information content for foreign
equities.5
Relative to the literature, the paper makes three main contributions. The ﬁrst is to
2 This global factor in private information is obtained after removing the eﬀects of global factors in
public information as detailed below.
3 The domestic asset pricing literature has also illustrated the potential role for common factors in
private information to explain some time series properties of returns (e.g. Subrahmanyam (1991) and
Chan (1993)).
4 We consider some additional possible economic explanations for our ﬁndings in Section 4.3 below.
5 Note that this advantage need not be limited to US investors; sophisticated investors in other
countries could also spend the resources to obtain correlated private information. However, as our data
set is limited to trades by US investors we can measure this eﬀe c ti nt h a tc o u n t r yo n l y .
2construct new empirical measures of trades due to private information. A limitation of
the existing empirical literature is the use of data sets from a speciﬁc country or short
time periods. Here, we extract the private information from a comprehensive data set
provided by the US Treasury. The data consist of monthly purchases and sales of equities
in the eight major foreign markets by US investors over the 1977 to 2003 period.
Changes in the share of a foreign market held by US investors must be due to ei-
ther public or private signals. The literature that examines international equity returns
has uncovered many public information variables that are useful in explaining the cross
section of expected returns (Karolyi and Stulz (2001)). We use these variables to ex-
tract the trades of US investors based on public information. We ﬁnd that the standard
instruments used to predict international equity returns also predict gross equity ﬂows
(purchases and sales) by US investors in these markets. The residuals from these regres-
sions represent (noisy) measures of trades due to US investors’ private information. We
use the gross ﬂows residuals to construct a measure of unanticipated net ﬂows.6 We label
these initial estimates our “broad” measures of private information.
Using monthly data to extract private information contains a potentially serious iden-
tiﬁcation problem: our broad measure may overstate the role of private information as
trades due to (public) news released during the month are counted as trades “due to pri-
vate information”.7 To solve this problem, we construct an alternative, “conservative”
measure of private information by including contemporaneous (end-of-month) values of
the public information variables and returns in the ﬂow regressions. By construction, this
measure is orthogonal to any public news released during the month that aﬀects returns.
Of course, this measure will understate the role of private information as all trades based
on private information that increase prices during the month are now counted as trades
due to public information. Thus, our conservative measure acts as a lower bound on the
private information content of trades while our broad measure acts as an upper bound.
Below, we show that our results are quite similar for the two measures and discuss any
diﬀerences.
The second contribution is to examine the factor structure of the private information.
Previous analyses of international expected return variation try to separate the inﬂuence
of global and local risk factors. Here, we are interested in describing the extent to which
measured private information displays signiﬁcant global components. We extract these
6 We provide evidence to show that our method of forecasting net ﬂows from separate forecasts of
gross purchases and sales results in a better measure of expected net ﬂows than by forecasting them
directly. Our modeling of expected net ﬂows due to public information thus improves on the approaches
in Bohn and Tesar (1996a,b), Brennan and Cao (1997), and Portes and Rey (2000).
7 For example, US investors could be “trend followers” purchasing foreign equities in response to
increasing foreign equity returns during the month (Froot et al. 2001).
3components using factor analysis and emphasize that this requires a comprehensive data
set like the one used in this paper. Our empirical tests show that a common or global
factor exists in US investors’ private information measured using either the broad or
conservative methods. This common factor accounts for roughly 55 per cent of the total
variation in private information of US investors.
The third contribution is to show that the global factor in private information predicts
international equity returns. Portfolio theory hypothesizes that trades due to private
information must forecast returns over longer holding periods, after controlling for public
information (Hasbrouck (1991a,b)). In contrast, noise trades and other contaminants
in our residuals will not have a long-run impact on prices. This leads to a test of our
measure. We use the latent-factor model of Hansen and Hodrick (1980) and Gibbons and
Ferson (1985) to model the cross section of expected international equity returns based
on public information. Using our broad measure of private information, we then show
that an unexpected net ﬂow by US investors into foreign equity markets has a statistically
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on international equity returns in the current and following three
months, holding the public information eﬀects constant. Under our conservative measure,
which is by construction orthogonal to contemporaneous returns, an unexpected net
ﬂow by US investors has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on international equity markets’
r e t u r n so v e rat h r e em o n t hh o l d i n gp e r i od .W ec o n c l u d et h a tU Si n v e s t o r sh a v es i g n i ﬁcant
private information about global markets.
We also ﬁnd that there is a persistent price impact in the US equity market using
both measures. This latter result supports the view that the common factor is derived
from the signal that US investors get about US asset and goods markets. In addition, the
private information eﬀects are large economically as they can account for a signiﬁcant
amount of the realized return variation in the countries that we examine. Our results
thus conﬁrm that private information matters, but they challenge the conventional (i.e.
country-speciﬁc) view of why it matters. Below we explain how our results can be
interpreted in light of the home bias and familiarity literatures mentioned earlier.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we outline our empirical approach. In
Section 3, we present our data and our models of the expected components of international
equity ﬂows and returns. We also show how the private information contains global
components. In Section 4, we document that our measures of private information can
be used to forecast returns. We also discuss how our results are robust to alternative
interpretations and give some economic motivations for them. In Section 5, we conclude.
42 The Asymmetric Information Framework
In this section we outline our framework and discuss how measures of private information
can be obtained and empirical tests of private information eﬀects may be performed.
2.1 Measuring trades due to private information
In a world where investors have constant absolute risk aversion and state variables are
conditionally normally distributed with constant variance, individual portfolio demands
are linear in the investor’s payoﬀ-relevant information.P a y o ﬀ-relevant information con-
tains all the information, public and private, that the investor would use in forecasting
future values of asset returns as well as her non-asset income (e.g. Albuquerque et al.
(2003)). Aggregating across all the individual demands yields a vector linear speciﬁcation










t is the aggregate net ﬂows by all US investors, Z0
t is a vector of public
information variables, Rt is the vector of excess returns on the risky assets, and It is
a vector of all information revealed by past signals that remains payoﬀ relevant during
the current month.8 We assume that all information in It is public and that it can
be captured by past net ﬂows in our empirical analysis. Indeed, if private information
matters, then we would expect It to move around, and lagged ﬂo w st ob es i g n i ﬁcant.9
The residual (Θσ∆σt + ut) represents the average private signal of US investors ∆σt
and the aggregate amount of noise trading activity ut. Private information signals can
be directly related to returns if they are informative about future expected dividends,
or indirectly if they represent signals about other variables that are in turn correlated
with returns.10 Also, each signal may be informative about a variety of assets. This can
be the case if there is correlated private information as in the models of Subrahmanyam
(1991) and Chan (1993).
8 In general, it is not clear that a time-invariant “summary vector” exists in an equilibrium setup
with private information. However, this is guaranteed if all past private information is revealed after
ﬁnitely many periods, as in Townsend (1983). In Albuquerque et al. (2003) we exhibit a setup with this
property in an equilibrium context.
9 In our regressions below, the serial correlation of the residuals is very close to zero when lags of
the dependent variable are incorporated in the regression. Thus, it seems that assuming that It−1 is also
observed by the econometrician is a good approximation.
10 As an example, an investor might have private information about her labor income which could
be correlated with the stock return of the ﬁr ms h ew o r k sf o ro ro ft h eo t h e rﬁrms in the industry.
5To obtain an empirical measure of aggregate private information from the net ﬂows
data, we ﬁrst have to specify the econometrician’s information set. Let







describe the information used by the econometrician to predict net ﬂows, where the time
t variables are end-of-month variables. Measured residuals from a linear projection of
the net ﬂows on the information set ˜ Ωt are:
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Residuals in the net ﬂows regression are a noisy measure of the aggregate private in-
formation of the investors as they include noise trading activity ut. Aggregate private
information captures ﬂows due to changes in the aggregate signal that cannot be forecast
from public information and is the central variable of interest in this study. This private
information is not available to any individual investor at the beginning of period t since it
relies on knowledge of end-of-period variables. This is true for the econometrician as well.
However, the residuals from a regression of realized net ﬂo w so nt h ei n f o r m a t i o ns e ta r e
an instrument for the aggregate private information of US investors.11 Importantly, only
private information signals have predictive power about future returns, though the exis-
tence of noise trading activity clouds the precision of the aggregate signal (Θσ∆σt +ut).
Below we show how to distinguish their eﬀects on prices from those of the noise trades.
Note that the current period return Rt is included in the information set ˜ Ωt. This
has two eﬀects on our measure of private information. The ﬁrst eﬀect is to mitigate the
impact of missing variables. This could be a serious problem as the econometrician may
be missing some of the public information variables Zt used by the agents. However,
including current market returns removes this bias as public information variables are
quickly incorporated into returns.12 The second eﬀe c ti st h a ti fp r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o ni s
quickly incorporated into prices, then including current month returns would eliminate
any private information eﬀects as well. For these reasons, we label this our “conservative”
measure of private information. We view this measure as providing a lower bound on the
contribution of private information to unexpected ﬂows.
11 It is worthwhile to digress some more on what is the average private signal of US investors ∆σt.
Suppose ﬁr s tt h a te a c hi n f o r m e dU Si n v e s t o rr e c e i v e sa ni . i . d .s i g n a lσi
t from the same distribution about
future expected dividends. In a population of many inﬁnitesimal US investors the average aggregate
private signal σt ≡
R
σi
tdi constitutes a signal on the mean expect dividend with a precision that is
deﬁnitely higher than that of each of the individual signals.
12 Andersen et al. (2003) show that news about a number of public information variables are incor-
porated into stock prices within a 5 minute period.
6For comparison, we also wish to provide a measure that acts as an upper bound on
the contribution of private information. We therefore construct an alternative measure of
private information using beginning-of-period values of the public information variables.





h≥1 so that no end-of-period variables are included.






W el a b e lt h i so u r“ b r o a d ”m e a s u r eo fp r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o n . W en o t et h a tt h i sm e a s u r e
may overstate the eﬀects of private information if investors trade on unexpected public
information released during the month. While our “conservative” measure of private
information ˜ υt in (1) accounts for such public information news, it will understate the
eﬀects of private information which are incorporated into prices during the period. It
turns out that our main results below are quite similar for the two measures.
Our focus is on the private information content of υt and ˜ υt that is relevant for
forecasting unexpected returns. We note, however, that in some models, both private
information measures could be related to hedge demands by the investors which do not
impact returns. This is possible if the aggregate of US investors is small enough relative
to the market. This is another potential source of noise in υt and ˜ υt and suggests that
we might underestimate the impact of private information on returns.
We can use our two measures of private information to examine the structure of the
information set used by investors in the international equity markets. It is standard to
divide the public information vector Zt into ‘global variables’ (such as the US interest
rate, which aﬀects equity prices in all of the countries), and ‘local variables’ (which may
aﬀect the equity return in a speciﬁc country). For the private information vector υt (or
˜ υt) no natural labeling is available. However, suppose there is a linear combination of




which explains a large fraction of the variance of υt. This suggests that there is a single
indicator driving private information which is relevant for trading in all markets. In
this sense, Υt is a ‘global factor’ in private information. We can also obtain e Υt = e φ
0
te υt
as the global factor in private information measured using the conservative measure. In
either case, a global factor in private information is consistent with traders having private
information about the global variables driving factor returns or about a systematic factor
in asset prices as in Subrahmanyam (1991).13 We construct such a factor below using
13 Work by Chan (1993) shows that common factors in market-wide private information are impor-
tant in explaining the cross-autocorrelation of domestic stock returns.
7factor analysis.
2.2 Private information and equity returns
To test whether our measures of global private information (Υt and e Υt)i m p a c te q u i t y
prices we need to specify an estimable model of returns. We adopt the latent-factor
model of Hansen and Hodrick (1983) and Gibbons and Ferson (1985). In a K−factor
m o d e l ,t h em a r k e tp r i c eo fr i s ko ft h ek-th factor can be written as a linear combination
of the set of L instruments Zt =( Z1,t,...,ZL,t) that are in the (public) information
set of the econometrician. Thus, the process for one-period returns conditional on the
econometrician’s information is described by:
Rt = βαZt−1 + βft + εt, (3)
where f is a K ×1 vector of factor realizations with E[ft|Zt−1]=0 , β = cov(Rt,f t|Zt−1)
is a constant N × K matrix, α is a K × L matrix, and f and ε are uncorrelated. In
this model, the linear combination αZt−1 represents the expected returns on the latent
factors, while the β matrix is the loading of the assets on the factors. The latent-factor
model of returns summarizes the public information relevant for forecasting returns in
a parsimonious way. For example, under a one-factor model, the estimated combination
αZt−1 is often interpreted as the return on the ‘global’ factor which is relevant for all
stock markets if world equity markets are integrated (e.g. Campbell and Hamao (1992)).
In this paper we wish to measure the eﬀects of unanticipated net ﬂows on unantici-
pated returns. Consider ﬁrst evaluating the eﬀects of our broad measure of global private
information on returns. Since Zt−1 and Υt are uncorrelated, we require that
E [Rt|Zt−1,Υt]=βαZt−1 + γΥt.
where the N × 1 vector γ measures the impact of unexpected net ﬂows on the cross
section of expected returns. Recall that the unanticipated net ﬂows contain both private
information and noise or liquidity trades. We therefore need to distinguish a positive
impact due to private information from one that would result from price pressure due to
the unexpected inﬂow of capital.
To overcome this diﬃculty, we test whether the price impact of the release of private
information is long lived in the spirit of Hasbrouck (1991a,b).14 Let R
t+H
t be the cumu-
lative equity return from the beginning of period t to the end of period t + H. Hence,
14 In Hasbrouck’s microstructure tests, the release of private information has a permanent impact
on future prices as he assumes expected returns are constant. This is not a very strong assumption
as the tests span a short period of calendar time. In his tests, public information is assumed to be
random and captured in the residual on the return equation in a vector autoregression. In the monthly
8we estimate the system:
R
t+H
t = βHαHZt−1 + γHΥt + εH,t, (4)
for each holding period H. We extend the holding period H of the investor from H =0 ,
where the stocks are held for the current month, out to three months (H =3 ).15 As
with the one-period model (3), the αH coeﬃcients capture the eﬀects of time-varying
returns on the latent factors over the holding period H while the βH coeﬃcients capture
how the cross section of international returns respond to the factor returns. We note
that diﬀerent factors may capture expected return variation at diﬀerent holding periods.
The γH coeﬃcients captures the eﬀects of the global component in unanticipated trades
over the diﬀerent holding periods. Over short holding periods (H =0 ), both private
information and noise based trades could have an eﬀect on returns. As the holding
period lengthens, the γH coeﬃcients will reﬂect the eﬀects of private information only as
noise based trades have a temporary impact. Thus the key test of the eﬀects of private
information on international equity returns is whether the γH coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant
for longer holding periods.
N o t et h a to u rm e t h o da l l o w su st ok e e pb o t ht h ep u b l i ca n dp r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o ns e t s
o ft h ei n v e s t o rc o n s t a n ta sw ei n c r e a s et h eh o l d i n gp e r i o d .A so t h e ri n v e s t o r so b s e r v et h e
unanticipated trades of the US investors, they will be able to gain some knowledge of the
private information. In eﬀect, some private information will become public information.
By holding the public information set constant, we can follow the tests advocated in the
microstructure literature and estimate the eﬀects of private information released at time
t on future prices (returns) without allowing for this additional contamination.
We also test for the eﬀects of our conservative measure of private information on
returns. Since e Υt and Rt are uncorrelated, the e γH coeﬃcients from a projection similar
to (4) will not be signiﬁcant for H =0by construction. However, if private information
does have long lived eﬀects, then future months’ returns will reﬂect the impact of private
information released at time t. Therefore, our tests of the eﬀects of the global factor in
the conservative measures of private information follow the same form as (4) for holding
periods H =1to 3 with e Υt replacing Υt.
The model is estimated by Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) separately for
each holding period H. Consider projecting the cross section of the returns onto the the
observations used in this paper, the assumption of constant expected returns is questionable as returns
vary in response to the release of public information. We thus test for the long-lived eﬀects of private
information on prices after accounting for time-varying expected returns.
15 Cumby (1989) and Lewis (1990,1991) perform similar tests of longer holding periods in latent
factor models.
9instrument set Zt−1 and the private information Υt:
R
t+H
t = ΦHZt−1 + γHΥt + εH,t.
The model imposes a number of cross equation restrictions on the N × L coeﬃcient
matrix ΦH. Under the model, the typical element of the matrix ΦH = βHαH is ΦH,n,l =
PK
k=1 βH,n,kαH,l,k, n =1 ,...,N and l =1 ,...,L. However, the model is not identiﬁed
and we follow the standard practice and assume βH,1 =1(for a one-factor model).
Under these speciﬁcations, ΦH has a reduced rank structure with rank(ΦH)=K.T h e s e
restrictions can be used as a test of the model using the GMM J-statistic which is
distributed as χ2 with (N − K)(L − K) degrees of freedom.16
Latent-variable models of international stock returns have been used by Harvey
(1991), Campbell and Hamao (1992), and Harvey, Solnik and Zhou (1994) among oth-
ers. The results of these studies are mixed. Campbell and Hamao (1992) examine the
integration of the US and Japanese equity markets and ﬁnd that a single latent-variable
model is rejected during the 1970s but not during the 1980s. Harvey (1991) ﬁnds that
the data reject a single source of risk across all of the world’s equity markets, implying
that the world market portfolio is not conditionally mean-variance eﬃcient. However,
the rejection is strongest for Japan; the model holds for the other countries examined in
the paper. Harvey et al. (1994) ﬁnd that a one to three latent-factor model is rejected by
the cross section of 18 country index returns. However, when they examine the models’
pricing errors and variance ratios, they ﬁnd that a two or three latent-variable model
captures the cross section of country returns.17
There are two reasons for adopting this latent-factor structure. First, the tests for
private information eﬀects outlined above require us to evaluate the impact of unexpected
16 We use the Newey-West form of the asymptotic covariance matrix with the number of lags equal
to H +3to capture any autocorrelation in εH,t. Ferson and Foerster (1994) examine the small-sample
properties of latent-variable models estimated by GMM. They ﬁnd that an iterated GMM procedure
results in coeﬃcient estimates with small biases but that the standard errors are understated. They
propose a correction factor which results in appropriate sized standard errors. We use the iterated
GMM approach and apply their small-sample correction factor to our standard errors.
17 One of the key assumptions in the latent variable model is that the betas are constant. This not
a strong assumption at the country level. Ferson and Harvey (1993) test an asset pricing model where
the risk factors are global but the conditional betas depend on country-speciﬁc attributes. They are
interested in the portion of variation of country returns that can be captured by time-varying risk premia
as opposed to time-varying betas. They ﬁnd that although time variation in the betas is statistically
signiﬁcant it contributes little to the variation in expected returns. Ferson and Harvey (1994) examine
whether country-speciﬁc fundamental attributes can be used to help motivate time-varying beta models.
Again, the risk premia are global while the betas are functions of speciﬁc country attributes which
they label “fundamental determinants”. They ﬁnd some limited support for their model. However, the
estimation approach used in both of these papers does not allow the cross-equation restrictions of a
global asset pricing model to be imposed.
10ﬂows on unexpected returns. We thus use the “usual suspects” in Zt which have been
shown in many other studies to forecast international equity returns. Second, imposing
the over-identifying restrictions of the latent-factor model results in more precise esti-
mates of return variation due to the public and private information variables. This latter
eﬀect is important due to the noisiness of monthly return data.18
We note that there is no reason to believe that the global factor impacts returns
in each individual country. This is because we construct the global factor using factor
analysis which only requires that the linear combination φ
0
tυt is composed of some, but
not all, of the elements in υt. As we stated in the introduction, if the global factor in
private information is related to the global stock market return, then a suﬃcient test is
the joint signiﬁcance of the factor across all of the returns.
Below, we pursue the estimation of the measures of private information (υt and ˜ υt),
the global factors in each of the measures of private information (Υt and e Υt)a n dt h e i r
eﬀects on the cross section of equity returns (γH and e γH) . Inference on these parameters
is at the center of the empirical tests in the paper.
3 Modeling Expected International Flow and Re-
turn Variation
We separate our empirical analysis of the cross section of expected international equity
ﬂows and returns into three parts. In the ﬁrst part, we describe the data. In the second
part, we provide the results of the empirical model of international equity ﬂows introduced
in section 2.1 and describe how we construct our measures of private information. In the
third part, we present the latent-variable model of the cross section of international equity
returns.
3.1 Data
Our data on the international equity ﬂows of US investors is obtained from the Treasury
International Capital (TIC) reporting system of the US Treasury.19 Financial institutions
18 Note that alternative models for the cross section of expected international equity returns (e.g. the
international version of the three-factor model presented in Fama and French (1998)) would use realized
returns on sub-portfolios (e.g. international book-to-market portfolios) as proxy variables for the factor
returns. These proxies would contain return variation due to the release of private information revealed
by the trades of US investors during the month, thus invalidating the tests using our broad measures of
private information.
19 There are a number of related studies that use the same data set (Tesar and Werner (1993, 1995),
Bohn and Tesar (1996a,b) and Brennan and Cao (1997)). See Froot et al. (2001) and Levich (1994) for
a description of limitations/advantages of US Treasury data.
11(banks, bank holding companies, securities brokers, dealers, and non-banking enterprises)
must report to the Treasury each month on all of their transactions with foreigners in
long-term securities (e.g. stocks and bonds) by country if their aggregate purchases or
sales total more than US $2 million in the month. As a result, the Treasury receives
comprehensive data on cross-border equity transactions for most US investors.
In this paper, we examine transactions by US investors in the equity markets of
eight large developed countries — Germany, Japan, UK, France, Canada, Netherlands,
Switzerland and Italy — which account for approximately 68 per cent of the market value
of non-US markets at the end of our sample period. There are several advantages to
limiting our analysis to these countries. First, using a group of relatively homogeneous,
developed countries allows us to measure the public and private components of the trades
correctly. Flows in and out of the equity markets in these countries are likely to be driven
by stable economic relationships for which there is an abundant list of instruments. In
contrast, the on-going process of liberalization of equity markets in developing coun-
tries leads to capital ﬂows that are mostly driven by changing risk-sharing opportunities
or declining transactions costs (e.g. Stulz (1999)). Distinguishing this eﬀect from the
asymmetric information eﬀect in the ﬂows would be diﬃcult.
Second, as a result of the liberalizations, models of portfolio ﬂows into emerging
markets suﬀer from several statistical problems that make them diﬃcult to estimate (e.g.
non-stationarity due to structural breaks from changing foreign ownership restrictions).
This is perhaps one of the reasons why researchers have focused on aggregated/regional
data across these countries (e.g. Froot et al. (2001), and Bekaert et al. (1999)). Third,
our data contain the net purchases of equities across a large cross section of countries
with long, coincident time spans. This is typically not available in other data sets and is
clearly necessary in order to measure common components in unexpected ﬂows and their
eﬀects on asset prices.
However, there are two main deﬁciencies with the data. First, the Treasury does not
collect data on transactions in derivative securities which have grown in importance in
recent years. For example, investors may decide to take a position in an international
equity market by purchasing a stock index futures contract at a lower transaction cost
than investing directly in the equity market. To the best of our knowledge, this criticism
applies to all datasets used in this literature. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
the Treasury collects data by geographic center and not by the country of origin of
the security. This means that the data may be unrepresentative for those countries that
contain large international ﬁnancial centers such as the UK and Switzerland. The typical
example of this is a European company that is issuing securities in the Euro-equity market
and sells the securities through banks in London to US investors. This transaction would
12be recorded as a sale of UK equity. Warnock and Cleaver (2002) examine the TIC data
in detail and ﬁnd that transactions to the UK are overstated while transaction to other
countries are understated. This may bias our results against ﬁnding signiﬁcant private
information eﬀects as the companies that are likely to issue equities via the Euro-equity
market are large companies that are well known outside their home country (Marr et
al. (1991)). However, these are the companies that foreign investors tend to hold, as
noted above. Thus, the TIC would seem to capture disproportionately net ﬂows for those
companies that are less likely to be aﬀected by global components of information.
The ﬂows data all exhibit a trend growth as US investors (slowly) increase their
net holdings of foreign equities. We thus follow the standard approach in the literature
and normalize the ﬂows data by dividing by the beginning-of-period value of the foreign
equity market index.20 Table 1a details our data set which ranges from January, 1977
(the start of the monthly TIC data) to May, 2003. The data are separated into gross
purchases, gross sales and net purchases of foreign equities by US residents. The volume
of transactions in the gross ﬂows are much larger than in the net ﬂows. US investors have
purchased (sold) foreign equities in amounts ranging from 0.150 per cent (0.136 per cent)
per month of the market value of Italian equities up to 0.865 per cent (0.825 per cent)
per month of UK equities. The high volume of transactions in UK securities is likely
overstated due to the presence of London as an international ﬁnancial center. There is
a much smaller volume of net purchases which range from 0.010 per cent per month for
German or Dutch equities up to 0.047 per cent per month for Canadian equities. The
gross ﬂows have higher volatilities than the net ﬂows as well as higher autocorrelations.
However, all of the normalized series appear stationary.
We use the Datastream equity return index available at the end of each month to
construct monthly returns. The indexes are based on the ﬁrms with the largest equity
values in each country. As there is evidence that foreign investors tilt their portfolios
towards the largest companies in each market, these indexes should be close to those
returns actually obtained by US investors in foreign markets. The returns are translated
into US dollars and the risk-free US interest rate is subtracted from them. Table 1b
presents the summary statistics of the excess returns. We note that the volatility of the
returns is much larger than that of the ﬂows. This has implications below when we try
to model the expected portions of ﬂows and returns.
Portfolio ﬂows and equity returns are contemporaneously correlated. Table 1c shows
the correlation coeﬃcients between the gross purchases, gross sales, and net purchases
by US investors and the contemporaneous excess equity return in the country. Gross
20 We use the Datastream total market index for the country’s equity market and convert it to US
dollars.
13purchases have correlation coeﬃcients ranging from −0.054 for ﬂows into the UK up to
0.121 for ﬂows into Italy. The correlations on gross sales are lower, with the ﬁgures for the
Germany, Japan and the UK being negative. The correlation between net purchases and
equity returns are larger than 0.10 for all countries except the UK (0.015), Switzerland
(0.065)a n dI t a l y( 0.094). This suggests either that US investors allocate funds to these
countries when expected returns are high and/or that the purchases themselves drive
up prices. Our test method presented in section 2.2 allows us to distinguish between
these eﬀects. The coeﬃcients also suggest that the large volume of purchases and sales
recorded for the UK and Switzerland are more likely due to activity in the Euro-equity
market.
3.2 Modeling expected international equity ﬂows
3.2.1 Public information sets
To estimate private information in the international equity markets, we need to separate
the equity ﬂows into expected and unexpected components. We use four diﬀerent sets of
public information variables to show that our results do not depend on which variables
we choose.
In the ﬁrst public information set (A), we use an autoregressive model to capture
the expected portion of the ﬂo w s .A sn o t e di nT a b l e1 a ,t h eﬂows are persistent and a
sixth-order autoregressive model is able to capture a substantial portion of the expected
ﬂows. This is similar to the approach by Warther (1995) who uses autoregressive models
for mutual fund ﬂows.21
In the second and third information sets (B and C), we choose public information
variables based on the belief that monthly international capital ﬂows are related to the
cross section of expected international returns.22 The persistence in the ﬂows is also
consistent with the existing evidence that expected equity returns are time varying and
persistent (see Chapter 7 in Campbell et al. (1997)). Hence, to model the expected
portion of ﬂows, we will use instruments that have been shown to predict the cross
section of international equity returns.
In this literature, it is common to separate the instruments into two groups, global
and local (e.g. Harvey (1991), Ferson and Harvey (1993,1994)), where the use of local
variables is justiﬁed by the existence of incomplete risk sharing. From this literature we
21 Our tests are robust to the choice of lag length (results available on request).
22 Bohn and Tesar (1996a,b) ﬁnd that net purchases are related to the cross section of expected
equity returns using a similar list of instruments. They also separate their instruments into local and
global groups. Our approach diﬀers by using the variables directly in modeling gross purchases and
sales, which turn out to be much more predictable than net purchases.
14select the short-term US interest rate, the US credit spread, the dividend yield on the
global stock market, the slope of the US term structure and the US equity return to act
as “global” variables. These variables can be thought of as capturing shocks to wealth
and risk tolerance of US investors and are lagged by one period so they are observable
by investors before any portfolio decisions would be made. The global variables, along
with lagged ﬂow variables to capture any missing expected ﬂows, are used as our second
data set (B). Table 1b provides the summary statistics of the global instruments, which
resemble those in many other papers.23
We also select a number of “local” variables for each foreign country. These include:
the lagged value of the country’s stock return (to capture any return chasing activities
by investors (Bohn and Tesar (1996a,b), Froot, O’Connell, Seasholes (2001)); the lagged
value of the country’s dividend yield and the diﬀerence in interest rates between the
country and the US (to act as instruments for expected return variation speciﬁct ot h e
country); and last month’s change in the spot exchange rate of the country’s currency
against the US dollar (to capture any exchange rate eﬀects). The third information set
(C) thus contains lagged ﬂows, and the global and local information variables.
To construct our fourth information set (D), we rely on the literature that exam-
ines the links between trading activity and market volatility. This literature shows a
positive contemporaneous correlation between conditional volatility and trading volume
(e.g. Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990), Gallant et al. (1992)). As our international
equity ﬂows represent the trading activity of a speciﬁc group of investors, it may be
that they are correlated with conditional volatility and that instruments which forecast
time-varying second moments can also forecast the ﬂows. We thus use a very simple au-
toregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) type representation to capture these
potential eﬀects. We form a small vector autoregression (VAR of order 1) composed of
the US excess equity return, the foreign country excess equity return and the change in
the spot exchange rate between the two countries. The squared and lagged estimated
residuals from this VAR act as instruments to forecast future ﬂows. Again we include
lagged ﬂows to capture any of the missing variation.
23 Most of the data are from Datastream. We use the 30-day Eurocurrency rate on the last business
day of each month as the risk-free interest rate for each country. We use the Datastream equity return
index and dividend yield on the index available at the end of each month. The dividend yield series is
deseasonalized in the usual manner (we take the average dividend over the last 12 months and divide by
the current price). The exchange rate is reported daily by Datastream in UK pounds and we translate
the end-of-month values into US dollar equivalents. The US credit spread is the diﬀerence between the
AAA and BBB bond yields available at the US Federal Reserve web site. The term structure slope is
the long bond yield from the OECD database less the 30 day Eurodollar interest rate.
153.2.2 Regression results
Summary statistics for OLS regressions of gross purchases and gross sales on the four dif-
ferent information sets are presented in Tables 2a and 2b, respectively. These regressions
use beginning-of-month values of the variables. The regressions using the end-of-month
values produce similar results and are available on request. A simple AR(6) speciﬁcation
(information set A) is able to capture a large part of the expected ﬂow variation with ¯ R2
measures (adjusted for degrees of freedom) ranging from 0.313 for France up to 0.948 for
the UK for gross purchases by US residents. A similar range is recorded for gross sales by
US residents. The combination of the lagged ﬂow variables and the global instruments
(information set B) also results in very high ¯ R2 measures for the gross ﬂows. When we
test the joint signiﬁcance of the global variables (excluding lagged ﬂows) we ﬁnd that
the restriction that all of the coeﬃcients on the global instruments are zero is strongly
rejected by the data for most countries. Thus, the global instruments that are typically
used to explain the cross section of international equity returns also explain the cross
section of international equity ﬂows. It is clear, however, that most of the predictability
comes from including the lagged values of the ﬂo w sa st h e ¯ R2 statistics increase only
marginally by including the global variables.
We test for the predictability of the local instruments by adding them to the existing
regression (information set C). Table 2 shows the resulting ¯ R2 measures and the χ2 tests
of their joint signiﬁcance. There is a small increase in the ¯ R2 statistics from adding the
local variables to the regression except for those explaining gross purchases of Italian
equities and gross sales of French and Italian equities. However, the local variables as a
group are jointly signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level for equity ﬂows in and out of about
half of the countries.
The fourth information set (D) uses lagged values of squared residuals to capture any
time variation in ﬂows related to time-varying volatility. The statistics show that while
these instruments are signiﬁcant in some of the regressions, they do not help to explain
time-variation in expected ﬂo w sm u c hb e y o n dt h a tc a p t u r e db yt h el a g g e dﬂow itself.
Most of the existing literature has focussed on explaining the expected component
of net portfolio equity ﬂows. While we ﬁnd that the gross ﬂo w sa r eq u i t ep r e d i c t a b l e ,
the net ﬂows are much less so. Table 2c provides the ¯ R2 and χ2 statistics for the OLS
regressions of the net equity ﬂo w so nt h ef o u ri n f o r m a t i o ns e t s . A sc a nb es e e n ,t h e
amount of linear predictability in the net ﬂo w si sm u c hs m a l l e rt h a ni nt h eg r o s sﬂows.
The adjusted ¯ R2 statistics for the net ﬂow regressions are below their counterparts for the
gross ﬂow regressions, with the former ranging from 0.015 for Italy to 0.310 for Japan
using the six lagged net ﬂows as regressors (instrument set A). The global, local and
16heteroskedastic variables also do not appear to capture much of the predictability in the
net ﬂows regressions.24
It appears that much of the predictability in our gross ﬂow regressions comes from
modeling the autocorrelation structure of the data. Bohn and Tesar (1996a) note the
strong autocorrelation in the net purchases data. They view this as a challenge for port-
folio theory as investors should adjust their portfolios in response to news about expected
returns which have little serial correlation. In our approach this is justiﬁed by assuming
that lagged ﬂows are good proxies for past information not in the econometrician’s in-
formation set. In general, there are other economic reasons to believe that ﬂows exhibit
“momentum” (Bohn and Tesar (1996a)). First, ﬁnancial ﬁrms may set long-run asset
holding targets that lead to smoothing and slowly trending ﬂows. Second, herding by
US investors at low frequencies would also deliver autocorrelation of ﬂows.
Our results also have interest for more general international asset pricing applications
that use similar forecasting variables. One potential criticism of most asset pricing appli-
cations is that many of these variables have been chosen by an on-going implicit process
of data snooping; i.e. choosing the variables based on ex-post statistical criteria of return
predictability. To the extent that the ﬂows data represent new sources of information
(given the correlations in Table 1c), the (limited) predictability shown here may alleviate
some of these concerns.
3.2.3 Constructing measures of private information of US investors
The regressions detailed in the previous section give us a way of estimating the expected
portion of the gross and net portfolio equity ﬂows. Following our derivations in section 2,
the private information of the US residents can be estimated by the unexpected portion
of the net equity ﬂows.25 In this subsection we discuss only the construction of our
broad measure of private information, and note that the exact same steps apply for our
conservative measure.
Recall from equation (2) that the vector of our broad measures of private information
is obtained from the unexpected net portfolio ﬂo w si n t ot h ee q u i t ym a r k e t so ft h ee i g h t
24 The small amount of predictability due to the global and local instruments for both the gross and
net ﬂows is somewhat surprising given the relationships found in the domestic market literature. For
example, Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) ﬁnd that statistical factors in the cross section of order ﬂows are
related to those in the cross section of returns on the 30 Dow Jones stocks. Lo and Wang (2000) ﬁnd
that some of the standard instruments used to predict stock market returns help predict turnover of the
NYSE-AMEX stocks.
25 Kaufmann, Mehrez, and Schmukler (1999) proceed in a similar fashion to obtain a measure of
private information. They use survey data on ﬁrm managers’ assessments of how the economy will
preform. The advantage of using ﬂow data is that investors actually “put their money where their
mouth is.”
17foreign countries and is denoted by υt =( υ1,t,...,υ8,t). Our regression results allow two
possible routes to estimating υt. One is to use net purchases of equities by US investors
in each foreign country as the dependent variable (Table 2c). The residual from that
regression is υt as desired. An alternative route is to estimate the regressions for gross








n,t are the residuals from the gross purchases and gross sales regressions
(Tables 2a and 2b), respectively.
Although the gross ﬂow regressions show substantially greater explanatory power
than their net ﬂow counterparts, it is uncertain as to whether the expected portion of
the net ﬂows are modelled better by using the diﬀerence between the expected gross
ﬂows or by using the net ﬂows directly in a regression. To answer this, we can construct
an expected net ﬂow variance ratio. The numerator is the variance of the expected net
ﬂow from the net ﬂow regressions (Table 2c). The denominator is the variance of the
implied expected net ﬂow constructed using the diﬀerence between the expected gross
purchases and expected gross sales (Tables 2a,b). A ratio below 1.0 indicates that the
approach using the gross ﬂow regressions is to be preferred. We can also test whether
this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. We regress the net ﬂows on both the lagged
gross purchases and gross sales and test if the coeﬃcients on the two sets of variables
are equal (and opposite in sign). The resulting test statistic is χ2 distributed with six
degrees of freedom (using the sixth-order autoregressive model).
Table 3 presents the estimated variance ratios and the asymptotic marginal signiﬁ-
cance levels (P-values) of the test statistics. For all countries and information sets, the
ratios are below 1.0, often by a substantial amount. It appears that this result is primar-
ily driven by the diﬀerent time-series properties of the gross purchases and sales which
are obscured when one models net ﬂows directly. This is shown in the ﬁrst column of the
table which compares the variances of the estimates using the AR models for the ﬂows.
Adding on other information variables to the basic AR speciﬁcation raises the variance
ratios in all cases. The P-values indicate that the diﬀerences between the coeﬃcients on
the lagged purchases and sales are statistically diﬀe r e n ta tt h e10 per cent level in six of
the eight countries examined for instrument sets A and C. In the following, therefore, we
use the gross ﬂow residuals to construct our measures of private information.
A sm e n t i o n e da b o v e ,i fU Si n v e s t o r sh a v es i g n i ﬁcant private information about the
foreign equity markets, this is likely to come from their analysis of global factors. We
can use the variance-covariance matrix of υt to test this hypothesis. We perform a factor
analysis on the residuals from the gross purchases and sales regressions separately (υP
n,t
18and υS
n,t, n =1 ,...,N). The factor analysis is done by both the method of iterated
principal factors and by maximum-likelihood estimation. The results presented below
are very similar across the two methods.
Table 4 presents the results of the factor analysis on the residuals from the gross ﬂow
regressions using the lagged ﬂows, global and local variables (instrument set C) for the
broad measure of private information. The results for the conservative measure are similar
and available on request. The ﬁrst factor captures 52.6 per cent of the unanticipated
purchases and 55.3 per cent of the unanticipated sales. Adding in the next two factors
raises the total variation captured to over 85 per cent of gross purchases and sales. We can
perform likelihood-ratio tests for the number of factors using the results of the maximum-
likelihood factor method. The tests reject the hypothesis that no factors are present in
the residuals but give conﬂicting results about the precise number of factors. The gross
purchases residuals reject a one-factor representation in favor of two factors with a P-
value of 0.003 per cent. However, a representation involving more than one factor model
is rejected for the gross sales residuals. Tests reject more than two factors for both sets of
residuals (not reported). Clearly then, the covariance matrices of the gross ﬂow residuals
show reduced rank structures associated with a common factor representation in total
private information.26
To measure the impact of global information in net ﬂows, we obtain the factors esti-
mated using the maximum likelihood method on the gross purchases and sales residuals.
As the scale of the factors is arbitrary, we normalize each to have a standard deviation
equal to the simple average standard deviation of its constituent residuals. We can then








t are the (normalized) global factors in the residuals from the gross
purchases and sales residuals, respectively.
3.3 Modeling expected international equity returns
To show that our global (public information) instrument set is able to capture time-
varying expected returns, we follow the literature and present some initial OLS regres-
sions of the excess stock returns on the global instruments without imposing any of the
restrictions of the asset pricing model or including the eﬀects of private information.
26 Froot et al. (2001) showed in the earlier versions of the paper that there is an important regional
factor in expected ﬂows. We have removed the expected portion of the ﬂows using the global and local
instrument sets and our factor analysis is thus concerned with unexpected ﬂows.
19Table 5 presents the ¯ R2 measures (adjusted for degrees of freedom) as well as the χ2
statistic of the test that the global variables are jointly insigniﬁcant. The low value of
the ¯ R2 statistics is typical in the equity return prediction literature. The χ2 statistics do
show however, that the global variables are signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level for 4 of the
9 countries (Germany, Japan, Netherlands and Switzerland) and signiﬁcant at the 10 per
cent level for the US. The instruments are not signiﬁcant at standard levels for the UK,
French, Canadian or Italian equity returns.
We also test whether the same local instruments that were used in the ﬂow regressions
also are able to capture expected return variation. When these variables are included
there is only a small increase in the degree of linear predictability in some of the countries
(Table 5). In addition, the χ2 statistics show that the local variables are signiﬁcant at
the 10 per cent level for the UK only (P-value of 0.088). Thus, it appears that the
cross-section of international equity returns can be modelled by the global instrument
set alone.27
We estimate the latent factor model (4) without any private information to examine
how it captures expected return variation. Imposing the restrictions of the latent-variable
model leads to precise estimates of the coeﬃcients on the global information variables.
Table 6a presents the estimated αH coeﬃcients for holding periods ranging from the
current month (H =0 ) to three months forward (H =3 ). The coeﬃcients are statistically
signiﬁcant on most of the variables (except the intercept) at most forecast horizons. The
coeﬃcient on the short-term US interest rate is negative as has been shown in other
studies. The coeﬃcient of the credit spread is signiﬁcant and negative at all forecast
horizons. The global dividend yield is shown to have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect
on international returns. The slope of the US term structure and the lagged US equity
market return change signs and are signiﬁcant at some forecast horizons, indicating that
their eﬀects on expected equity return variation depend on the holding period examined.
The estimated βH coeﬃcients are presented in Table 6b. Recall that the coeﬃcient on
the US equity returns is normalized to 1.00 for identiﬁcation. The coeﬃcients are precisely
estimated for most of the foreign country returns. For the current month (H =0 ), the
coeﬃcients range from 1.0 for the US returns up to 3.4 for Swiss returns. All of the
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level indicating that the single global factor
forecasts the cross section of international returns. As the holding period H lengthens,
27 This is a diﬀerent picture than the one given for ﬂows where local factors were shown to (mar-
ginally) increase the models’ explanatory power. If these local variables represent the eﬀects of a local
factor in ﬂows then it may be that there is also a local factor in returns. However, the return regressions
may not capture this factor as returns are much noisier than ﬂows. This does not aﬀect our tests be-
low as the measures of private information constructed using instrument set C are orthogonal to these
variables.
20the Japanese coeﬃcients decrease so that they are negative for a three month holding
period. The poor showing for Japanese returns is in line with the results in many other
papers (e.g. Campbell and Hamao (1992), Harvey (1991)) and suggest that the Japanese
equity market is not integrated with world markets. In addition, the Canadian and
Italian coeﬃcients become insigniﬁcant. This may be indicating either that these equity
returns respond diﬀerently to the global risk factor as the forecast horizon lengthens or
that the model may be missing an additional risk factor.28
The model is able to capture return variation due to public information. To show
this, we construct a variance-ratio statistic similar to the ones presented by Campbell and
Hamao (1992) and Harvey (1991). The numerator is the variance of the ﬁtted values from
equation (4), denoted var(ˆ βHˆ αHZt−1),w h e r eˆ βH and ˆ αH are the GMM coeﬃcients for
holding period H given in Tables 6aa n d6b, respectively. The denominator is the variance
of the ﬁtted values from an OLS regression of the excess return on the global instruments
var(b δZt−1). The variance ratio thus shows how imposing the baseline model’s over-
identifying restrictions leads to a degradation of the data’s ability to forecast expected
returns.
The results are presented in Table 6c. As can be seen, the latent-variable model
does a good job at capturing expected return variation. The ratios range from 0.140 for
Japanese returns up to 1.751 for Swiss returns during the current month (H =0 ). As
the holding period lengthens, the impact of the model’s restrictions increases for some
countries and the ratios fall (e.g. Canadian and Swiss returns). Some of the other ratios
increase (e.g. German and Dutch returns).
In Table 6c, we also present the J-statistics that evaluate the over-identifying restric-
tions of the latent-variable model. The J-statistics show that the model is not rejected
at any forecast horizon. Given the performance of the one-factor latent-variable model
according to all of these metrics, we will use it as our model of public information in the
subsequent tests.
4 Private Information Test Results
Equipped with our measures of US investors’ private information and a baseline model
of expected return variation, we now analyze whether the release of private information
aﬀects returns. We start by presenting our results on the impact of global private in-
formation. We follow with a simple economic metric to evaluate the importance of the
28 We note below that our results using the conservative measures of private information are robust
to missing risk factors.
21private information. Finally, we explain how our results can be interpreted and why
alternative explanations are unlikely.
4.1 Impact of global private information
The top panel of Table 7 presents the value of the chi-squared statistics associated with
the Wald test of the null hypothesis that all of the γH coeﬃcients in (4) based on our
global factor from the broad measure of private information (6) are jointly equal to zero.29
The low P-values indicates that the global factor is jointly signiﬁcant across all of the
foreign countries and holding periods regardless of the instrument set used to construct
the expected equity ﬂows. The bottom panel of the table shows the corresponding tests
for the conservative measure of private information.30 Overall the tests statistics based
on the conservative measures are lower as they are orthogonal to contemporaneous infor-
mation. As the conservative measures using instrument sets B and C are orthogonal to
contemporaneous stock returns, they are not statistically signiﬁcant in the current month
(H =0 ). However, the global factor based on the conservative measures is statistically
signiﬁcant over longer holding periods (H =1to 3 months).
Table 8a presents the individual γH coeﬃcients on the broad measures of private
information over the diﬀerent holding periods using the global and local information
variables in the ﬂow regressions (instrument set C). Each coeﬃcient is presented with
the small-sample standard error and P-value. The joint signiﬁcance tests presented in
Table 7 are repeated here for convenience. The coeﬃcients are positive for all of the
returns in the current month (H =0 ) indicating that the private information available
to US investors leads to higher stock returns. As US residents make an unexpected net
purchase of foreign stocks, foreign stock indexes rise. We note that the global factor
is positive and signiﬁcant for US equity returns even though the factor was constructed
from net purchases in foreign equity markets. The fact that the global factor is positively
related to both US and foreign equity returns indicates that it is related to the common
component present in world-wide equity returns.
The magnitude of the coeﬃcients is in basis points. Thus a one basis point increase in
the (normalized value of) US net purchases in all foreign markets leads to a 8.5 basis point
increase in UK excess equity returns (measured in US dollars). Below, we present some
29 Some authors (e.g. Harvey and Zhou (1993)) have noted potential problems with Wald tests in
systems with instrumental variables and have advocated calculating the Gallant-Jorgensen (1979) (G-J)
test statistic as well. We have calculated the G-J test statistics and found that all of the G-J statistics
are larger in value than our reported Wald statistics. Both test statistics are χ2 distributed with 8
degrees of freedom.
30 Note that there is no conservative measure of private information using instrument set A as it
contains only lagged values of the ﬂow series.
22variance-ratio statistics to get a better measure of the economic importance of private
information on returns. The individual coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level
for all but two of the equity returns (German and Japanese stocks are the exceptions).
The release of private information has a long-run price impact as the coeﬃcients
over longer holding periods (H =1to H =3 ) are also mostly positive and statistically
signiﬁcant. Some of the estimated coeﬃcients measuring the eﬀects of private information
on Japanese, UK and Swiss equity returns are poorly estimated. This is likely due to
two separate eﬀects. Japanese returns are likely not integrated with other international
equity market returns as shown in the tests in section 3.3 above. The measures for the
UK and Swiss returns are problematic due to these countries acting as ﬁnancial centers.
In addition, the coeﬃcients on the French returns are small and insigniﬁcant.
Table 8b presents the estimated e γH coeﬃcients on the global factor constructed using
the conservative measures of private information. Recall that our conservative measure
of private information uses the end-of-month values of all of the forecasting variables
to remove any potential simultaneity problems where ﬂows respond to realized returns
or other public information released during the month. Thus, our results are also free
of any potential bias due to contemporaneous trend following of US investors in many
foreign markets. However, for the same reason, the conservative measure will not capture
a lot of the private information released during the month. As a result, obtaining precise
estimates of the individual country’s loadings on the global factor in private information
will be more diﬃcult.
Table 8b bears out this intuition. During the current month (H =0 ), the coeﬃcients
are not statistically signiﬁcant as the estimated private information shock is orthogonal to
both US and foreign country contemporaneous returns. Over longer holding periods, the
individual country coeﬃcients are smaller than their counterparts for the broad measure.
However, the coeﬃcients are jointly signiﬁcant for holding periods of a month or more.
In addition, the coeﬃcients are mostly positive, indicating that as US investors make
unexpected purchases across all of the foreign countries the foreign equity indexes rise
in response to the release of private information. The only coeﬃcient that is negative at
the three month holding period (H =3 ) is the one on French returns which was small
and insigniﬁcant even using the broad measure. As before, the impact of US private
information on Japanese returns is very small.
To summarize, the joint tests using the conservative and broad measures both show
that the unexpected component of US residents net purchases of foreign securities leads
to a long-run increase in the prices of the stocks. As these measures provide lower and
upper bounds on the private information set of the US investors, we conclude that the
investors have signiﬁcant private information about international equity markets. In
23particular, the global factor in their private information predicts both US and foreign
equity returns.31 We attribute this to US investors having signiﬁcant private information
about US based factors. Given the size of the US market and its integration with other
markets, this information will help them allocate assets around the world. As they
trade, this information gets impounded into prices. Below we discuss several potential
alternative explanations and show why they are unlikely.
The long-lived nature of the private information found in this paper may be surprising
to some. However, other papers that examine higher-frequency data on international
portfolio transactions also ﬁnd that there is a persistent impact of unexpected net ﬂows
on returns. Froot et al. (2001) estimate a VAR on daily ﬂows and returns similar to that
of Hasbrouck (1991a) and ﬁnd persistent price impacts from unexpected ﬂows that last
for at least 60 days.32 However, they are unable to determine whether this low-frequency
predictability is caused by the private information of US investors or by price pressure.
In a subsequent analysis, Froot and Ramadorai (2001) use closed-end country fund data
to separate the eﬀects of private information from price pressure. They ﬁnd evidence in
favor of the information story with US investor ﬂows resulting in persistent price impacts
that last for several weeks. However, as they note, using such an approach depends on
the adequacy of the model of closed-end fund demand.
By relying on a longer data set and an asset-pricing model, our approach examines
the low-frequency predictability more directly. In particular, we can account for the
autocorrelation in the gross ﬂo w sa sw e l la st h ee ﬀects of public information releases on
both ﬂows and returns. The results show a signiﬁcant impact of total private information
on international equity returns. We note that this information is superior relative to all
non-US investors; US investors may not have superior information about foreign equity
markets relative to the investors in that particular country.
4 . 2 I m p a c to nr e t u r nv a r i a t i o n
We next construct variance-ratio statistics to gauge the importance of private information
on realized return variation. The ratios are presented in Table 9. The denominator in each
ratio is the standard deviation of realized excess equity return in each of the countries.
The numerator is the absolute value of the estimated γH (e γH)c o e ﬃcients times the
standard deviation of the corresponding measure of global private information. Again,
31 In a previous version of the paper, we found that the total individual country trades (υt and ˜ υt)
also contained signﬁcant private information about the cross section of returns. Thus our ﬁnding is not
due to the selection of the global factor in the trades.
32 In their structural VAR, Froot et al. (2001) ﬁnd no impact from unexpected ﬂows on subsequent
returns in developed countries.
24both measures of private information are constructed using instrument set C (lagged
values of the ﬂows, plus global and local instruments). These ratios estimate the impact
of a one standard deviation shock to the global factor in the private information of US
investors on international equity returns.
The table shows that the release of private information has a substantial eﬀect on
realized return variation over short holding periods. A one standard deviation shock
to the broad measure of private information results in an increase in contemporaneous
realized equity returns ranging from 8.8 p e rc e n tf o rJ a p a nu pt o17.5 per cent for the
Netherlands. Over longer holding periods, the eﬀect of private information is reduced but
it continues to have an impact. For a three month holding period, private information
accounts for 1.4 per cent of French realized returns up to 13.4 per cent of Italian returns.
The impact of the conservative measures of private information is naturally smaller,
accounting for 0 to 8 per cent of three month realized returns (for Japan and Italy,
respectively). In addition, the global factor can account for 5.2 to 10.3 per cent per cent
of realized US equity return variation based on the two measures.
4.3 Interpretation
Our results showing a global factor in the private information sets of US investors are in
contrast with the perceived notion in the academic literature that investors in interna-
tional equity markets trade mostly on speciﬁc knowledge about certain countries.33 The
most likely interpretation of a common factor in US investor private information is that
it originates in superior information about US economic variables. This superior infor-
mation may come from several sources. For example, US investors could have superior
knowledge about US business cycle variation. Lumsdaine and Prasad (1999) estimate a
common component in industrial production growth rates in seventeen OECD countries.
The average weight of US industrial production in this common component is 38.92 per
cent, well above the weights for all of the other countries. This common component is
shown to drive industrial production in all of the countries. Kwark (1999) ﬁnds that
shocks to US output are important in explaining shocks to foreign country output. Supe-
rior knowledge of US industrial production or aggregate output would then be of beneﬁt
in many countries.
US investors could also have a superior ability to interpret US monetary or produc-
33 In the usual setup of the conventional view, conditional return correlations are assumed to be
zero. If, on the other hand, conditional correlations of country index returns are, say, positive, investors
perceive the assets as substitutes and trade on a country stock index after observing signals that are
speciﬁc to another country’s stock index. In this oﬀshoot of the conventional view, the prices of both
assets respond to each country’s speciﬁc private information, making the private information global.
25tivity shocks which would help in forecasting growth in foreign economies. Kim (2001)
estimates several diﬀerent identiﬁed vector autoregression models of the eﬀects of US
monetary policy shocks on the current account and foreign country growth. He ﬁnds
that expansionary shocks to US monetary policy increase imports in the short run. It
also causes higher growth in the non-US developed countries with much of the eﬀect com-
ing from a reduced real world interest rate. Glick and Rogoﬀ (1995) analyze productivity
shocks in the manufacturing industries of seven major industrial countries and ﬁnd that
gross investment responds to a global productivity shock.
Sophisticated investors may also gain an information advantage by monitoring the
customer order ﬂows of other investors. For example, the proprietary trading desks
of large ﬁnancial institutions will be able to observe order ﬂows in many markets. In
addition, sophisticated US investors may also have private knowledge about links between
US ﬁrms and ﬁrms in particular foreign countries. This may arise from customer or
supplier relationships or proposed merger or acquisition activity. Gehrig (1998) discusses
the information externalities that are present in large ﬁnancial centers such as New York.
The results in this paper are related to a growing literature which examines the eﬀect
of private information on portfolio stocks and ﬂows. A number of papers have shown that
foreign investors tend to hold those domestic securities that are more familiar to them.
For example, Kang and Stulz (1997) ﬁn dt h a tf o r e i g ni n v e s t o r si nJ a p a nt e n dt oh o l d
shares of larger ﬁrms and ﬁrms with signiﬁcant export sales. They argue that investors
a r el i k e l yt oh a v em o r ei n f o r m a t i o na b o u tt h e s eﬁrms (see also Choe, Kho, and Stulz
(1999) for Korea). Similarly, Dahlquist and Robertson (2001) examine foreign ownership
of Swedish ﬁrms and show that foreigners display a preference for ﬁrms with a signiﬁcant
presence in international markets (ﬁrms with a foreign listing or with high export sales),
controlling for ﬁrm size. Presumably these ﬁrms have greater exposure to global factors
in public and private information. Using a sample of 48 countries, Ahearne, Griever, and
Warnock (2001) ﬁnd that the share of a country’s stock market that is publicly listed in
the United States (a measure inversely related to private information) is an important
determinant of the bias in US foreign stock ownership, even after controlling for a variety
of instruments including transactions costs of trading in the country and direct barriers
to foreign ownership.34 Our results about foreign equity ﬂows are not inconsistent with
these results about foreign equity holdings.
As discussed in the introduction, the ﬁnding of a global factor in private information
is consistent with those papers that show that foreign investors do not underperform
34 See Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Huberman (2001) for similar eﬀects in domestic equity
markets. There is also evidence that the volume of transactions between countries is correlated with
measures of information ﬂow (Portes and Rey (2000)).
26domestic investors. It is also consistent with the results in Tkac (2001) who examines the
performance of US managers of international open-end mutual funds during the 1990-
1999 period. She ﬁnds that managers of well-diversiﬁed funds have signiﬁcant positive
Jensen alphas relative to a global equity index. In contrast, most managers of regional or
country-speciﬁc funds do not outperform the appropriate benchmark fund. These results
are to be expected as the global factor of private information will be relatively more
important for well-diversiﬁed international mutual funds.
According to our results, US investors are likely to play a special role in international
markets. Rather than suﬀering from an information disadvantage because of insuﬃcient
local information, they may enjoy an information advantage because of superior global
information. At ﬁrst sight, this view appears inconsistent with the home-bias puzzle.
However, it is possible that being relatively better informed about their home market
causes US investors to tilt their portfolios towards that market, or to securities more
closely related to it. In other words, the ‘comparative information advantage’ which
makes them hold the majority of US equities is consistent with an absolute advantage in
holding foreign equities.
However, one issue that our analysis cannot address is the relevance of the global
factor in private information across investors from diﬀerent countries. For example,
it may be that French investors have superior total private information about French
securities as they have better country-speciﬁc information while having worse global
private information. Hence, for these investors, the global factor in private information
constitutes a smaller component of total private information.
4.4 Potential alternative explanations
O u rm e a s u r e so fp r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o nm a yb ec o n t e n t i o u sa sw eh a v ee x t r a c t e dt h e m
from monthly data and there are a number of potential alternative explanations for
our ﬁndings. One potential alternative explanation is price pressure: unanticipated net
inﬂows into a country’s equity market cause prices to rise even if they are devoid of
information content as the market absorbs the extra demand. However, there are two
primary reasons why the price pressure explanation is unlikely using our monthly data.
First, the net ﬂows shown in Table 1 are a very small portion of the total market value
and the unanticipated net ﬂows will be an even smaller portion. The markets that
we examine are all in developed countries where there should be adequate liquidity for
absorbing such small amounts. Second, if there were temporary price pressure impacts
from unanticipated ﬂows, then there should be immediate reversals. However, the eﬀects
remain positive as H increases.
27A second potential alternative explanation is that idiosyncratic shocks are being
recorded as trades due to private information. In principle, these shocks need not corre-
spond to news about future asset payoﬀs. Instead, there might be shocks to individual
wealth or preferences.35 However, any such candidate shock aﬀects the interpretation
of our results only if the average shock (i) has persistent price impact and (ii) is not
observable. Condition (i) arises because our measures help predict returns.36 It suggests
that our results are not driven by simple preference shocks that are iid over time (though
correlated in the cross section), for example generated by a group of “noise traders”
exerting “price pressure”. Condition (ii) arises because we identify the average trade
by US investors due to private information that is orthogonal to public signals and, un-
der the conservative measure, orthogonal also to current returns. It suggests that we
are not simply picking up an average of shocks to individual wealth. Such an average
should be closely related to returns, and would be counted as ‘public’ by our conservative
measure.37
The third, and potentially most serious alternative explanation, is that we are count-
i n gt r a d e sd u et op u b l i ci n f o r m a t i o na st r a d e sd u et op r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o n .A sm e n t i o n e d
above, this is a potential problem with our broad measures of private information where
our instruments have beginning-of-month values. However, this is not a concern with our
conservative measures of public information where our instruments have end-of-month
values. Note that our conservative measures of private information base on information
set C also include both the realized US equity return (in the global variables) and the
realized local equity return (in the local variables). As mentioned above, using realized
returns captures the impact of any public information variable that we have omitted from
our ﬂow regressions while also diminishing the private information eﬀects. The fact that
our conservative measures still have forecasting ability for future returns shows that our
ﬁndings are not due to omitted public information.
Our analysis is also robust to omitted factors in the latent-factor model of returns.
If the missing factor is a function of the public information variables that we have used,
then the broad measures of private information are orthogonal to the missing factor and
our results go through. If the missing factor is a function of omitted public informa-
35 Indeed, we know that some trades by some agents have to be due to such shocks in order for any
trades due to private signals to be valuable; i.e. signals are valuable only if prices do not reveal them.
In the theoretical literature, this also requires that there is another unobservable factor, such as noise
traders or supply shocks, driving prices. Of course, this factor need not aﬀect trades by US investors.
36 Of course, our results could be explained by serially correlated noise trader demands. But at some
level, any pattern can be rationalized by a well-chosen noise distribution.
37 The fact that our two measures are so similar thus conﬁrms the ﬁnding of Bohn and Tesar (1996b)
that portfolio rebalancing is not an important determinant of US investors’ net trades.
28tion variables, then the use of realized returns in the conservative measures of private
information should capture this eﬀect.
Finally, a potential criticism is that the model of expected equity ﬂows does not impose
enough structure to separate private information from portfolio inventory shocks or other
microstructure type shocks (e.g. smoothing of the price process by the specialist, stale
quotes, etc.). These microstructure eﬀects are important at very short horizons of one
day or less whereas our data is monthly. In addition, theory suggests a demanding test
for measures of private information. The key insight is that private information partially
revealed through trades causes a persistent impact on a security’s price. Thus, a shock
to private information is diﬀerent from other shocks by its persistent price impact. This
is what Tables 7 and 8 above showed for both the broad and conservative measures of
private information.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Despite its increasing theoretical importance in accounting for several features of inter-
national equity ﬂows and returns, there is little empirical evidence about the size and
sources of private information and many important questions remain unanswered. This
paper addresses some of these questions. In order to obtain measures of the private in-
formation of US investors, we estimate an empirical model of international equity ﬂows.
The models of gross purchases and sales of foreign equities by US investors work ex-
tremely well with an average ¯ R2 of approximately 65 per cent across our sample of eight
countries. We show that modeling gross ﬂows results in a better model of expected net
ﬂows than modeling net purchases directly. We then test for a factor structure in our
measures of the total private information of US investors. The main or global factor
accounts for over half of the variation in total private information.
We ﬁnd that our measures of private information have a signiﬁcant impact on the
cross section of international equity returns. Although the trades of US investors consti-
tute a very small amount of the total market capitalization of the foreign country, the
unexpected ﬂows are able to predict returns. The impact of measured private information
is also large relative to realized return variation; a one standard deviation shock to US
investors’ global private information accounts for between 5 and 10 per cent of realized
US equity return variation over a three month period. We show that our results are ro-
bust to potential “noise trading” by US investors, trading on omitted public information,
and other potential model misspeciﬁcations.
Our results suggest that US investors are likely to play a special role in international
markets. Rather than suﬀering from an information disadvantage because of insuﬃcient
29local information, they may enjoy an information advantage because of superior global
information. This information advantage appears to be long lived and suggests potential
trading strategies where (sophisticated) US investors outperform the average non-US
investor participating in the foreign equity market. More analysis is required to see
whether this is possible. Our analysis simply shows that US investors have signiﬁcant
private information about the returns on the indexes of these countries. We do not
analyze how to take an optimal position in the cross section of ﬁrms in these markets.
We have chosen to work only with developed country data to avoid complications with
transition periods associated with emerging stock markets. However, work by Morck et
al. (2000) shows that there is greater price co-movement in these markets as opposed
to developed markets. This suggests that our ﬁndings may be even stronger in these
markets.
Finally, our results must be incorporated into any examination of the home bias puz-
zle. It is clear from our results that there is a group of US (institutional) investors who
have signiﬁcant private information about foreign equity markets and that a substantial
portion of this information results from a global factor. The results in Tkac (2001) cited
above show that they can outperform appropriate benchmarks. This raises two ques-
tions. The ﬁrst is why do other US investors not hire these institutions to allocate their
portfolios in international equity markets? One potential explanation is the existence of
agency problems between the client and the fund manager, yet this seems to be a less
than satisfactory explanation as these problems would also exist in a purely domestic
setting. For example, a US investor choosing among (domestic) US mutual funds faces
the problem of deciding whether the fund managers have signiﬁcant ability, part of which
will include private information. Why is that investor’s choice any diﬀerent with respect
to choosing an international fund manager? In both cases, the fund managers will have
private information that the investor may never be able to obtain.
The second question raised by our analysis is whether US investors have an absolute
information advantage across all equity markets through their better knowledge of the
global factor in private information. This ﬁnding is also not inconsistent with the home
bias puzzle, as it is likely that US investors have a ‘comparative information advantage’
in their own equity market. More research is needed on the composition of private
information for investors around the world.
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Table 1a 
Summary Statistics of US Investors’ International Portfolio Equity Flows 
 
The table shows summary statistics of US investors’ gross purchases, gross sales, and net purchases of 
foreign equities from Germany, Japan, UK, France, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland and Italy. All of 
the series are expressed in monthly per cent continuously compounded form. The series have been 
normalized by dividing by the market value of the foreign equity index at the start of the month, both 
expressed in US dollars. The sample period is January, 1977 to May, 2003. The three estimated 
autocorrelations of the series are for a one, six and twelve month lag, respectively. 
   











         
US Investors’ Gross Purchases of Foreign Equities   
         
Germany  0.196  0.152  0.870 0.764 0.697 
Japan  0.176  0.175  0.943 0.896 0.884 
UK  0.865  0.703  0.963 0.941 0.934 
France  0.266  0.121  0.474 0.330 0.107 
Canada  0.632  0.373  0.834 0.671 0.538 
Netherlands  0.249  0.147  0.683 0.521 0.395 
Switzerland  0.393  0.193  0.616 0.350 0.300 
Italy  0.150  0.160  0.611 0.508 0.427 
         
US Investors’ Gross Sales of Foreign Equities   
         
Germany 0.186  0.152  0.915 0.811 0.746 
Japan  0.161  0.163  0.962 0.941 0.920 
UK  0.825  0.702  0.967 0.946 0.937 
France  0.224  0.094  0.473 0.311 0.223 
Canada  0.584  0.361  0.850 0.767 0.642 
Netherlands  0.239  0.149  0.744 0.674 0.603 
Switzerland  0.352  0.168  0.499 0.311 0.166 
Italy  0.136  0.153  0.580 0.459 0.358 
         
US Investors’ Net Purchases of Foreign Equities   
         
Germany  0.010  0.061  0.311 0.116 0.097 
Japan 0.015  0.049  0.539  0.032  -0.098 
UK  0.040  0.109  0.271 0.102 0.143 
France 0.043  0.114  0.281  0.125  -0.009 
Canada 0.047  0.163  0.404  0.067  -0.023 
Netherlands 0.010  0.102  0.365  0.076  -0.045 
Switzerland 0.042  0.156  0.277  -0.034  -0.023 
Italy 0.014  0.142  0.146  0.056  -0.022 
         
  
Table 1b 
Summary Statistics of Excess Equity Returns and Global Instruments 
 
The table shows summary statistics of: (i) excess equity returns from the US, Germany, Japan, UK, 
France, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy; and (ii) the global instrument set: the US short-
term interest rate (rt
US ), the US credit spread (crspt
US ), the dividend yield on the global equity market 
(divt
all), the slope of the US term structure (slt
US) and the excess returns on US stocks (rst
US) (shown in 
the first line of the table). All of the series are expressed in monthly per cent continuously compounded 
form.  The sample period is January, 1977 to May, 2003. The three estimated autocorrelations of the 
series are for a one, six and twelve month lag, respectively. 
 











         
Excess equity returns     
         
US 0.396  4.470  0.024  -0.001  0.013 
Germany 0.170  5.888  -0.031  0.064  0.020 
Japan 0.061  6.554  0.097  -0.002  0.052 
UK  0.540  5.417  -0.040 -0.052 -0.083 
France 0.531  6.628  0.030  0.014  -0.053 
Canada 0.226  5.293  0.061  0.042  -0.105 
Netherlands 0.501  4.926    -0.050  0.013  0.065 
Switzerland 0.411  5.167    0.074  -0.029  0.003 
Italy  0.400  7.439  0.067 0.093 0.063 
         
         
Global instruments       
         
rt
US   0.618  0.310    0.968 0.860 0.769 
crspt
US    0.090  0.037   0.965  0.824  0.677 
divt
all   0.217   0.086  0.994  0.962  0.916 
slt
US   0.067   0.154  0.925  0.684  0.496 
         
  
Table 1c 
Correlations of US Investors’ Gross Purchases, Gross Sales, and Net Purchases  
of Foreign Equities with Foreign Excess Stock Returns 
 
The table shows correlation coefficients of US investors’ gross purchases, gross sales, and net purchases of 
foreign equities with the excess return on the stock market in that country. The flows data are presented in Table 
1a while the excess returns are given in Table 1b.  
 






















   
     
 Gross  Gross  Net 
 Purchases  Sales  Purchases 
 
Excess return in: 
 
   
Germany 0.074  -0.004  0.193 
     
Japan 0.030  -0.066  0.324 
     
UK -0.054  -0.056  0.015 
     
France  0.117 0.024 0.104 
     
Canada  0.111 0.021 0.207 
     
Netherlands  0.108 0.037 0.102 
     
Switzerland  0.055 0.003 0.065 
     
Italy  0.121 0.040 0.094 
      
Table 2a 
Summary Statistics from OLS Regressions of US Investors’ Gross Purchases  
of Foreign Equities on Different Information Sets 
 
The table presents summary statistics from OLS regressions of gross purchases of foreign equities by US 
investors on four information sets: (A) six lagged values of the gross purchases; (B) lagged purchases plus the 
global instruments; (C) lagged purchases plus global and local instruments; and (D) lagged purchases plus lagged 
squared residuals from a vector autoregression of the US excess stock return, the foreign country excess stock 
return and the change in the exchange rate. The global instruments are detailed in Table 1b. The local instruments 
(all lagged one period) include: the foreign country’s stock return; the foreign country’s dividend yield; the 
difference in interest rates between the foreign country and the US; and the change in the spot exchange rate of 
the country’s currency against the US dollar. The 
2 R
  statistics are adjusted for degrees of freedom. The value of 
the chi-squared test statistic associated with the Wald test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the 
explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero is shown in the column (χ
2) along with its asymptotic marginal 
significance level (P-value). In some of the tests, the degrees of freedom are adjusted lower due to 
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squared residuals 
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   P-value  P-value  P-value   P-value 
                
                
Germany 0.783  1073.27  0.788  15.31  0.789  8.62  0.786  34.99 
   <0.001    0.009    0.071    <0.001 
                
Japan 0.906  2698.26  0.907  10.84  0.908  5.52  0.904  7.81 
   <0.001    0.055    0.238    0.554 
                
UK 0.948  6453.80  0.948  6.86  0.948  7.31  0.951  49.61 
   <0.001    0.231    0.120    <0.001 
                
France  0.313  207.54 0.336 21.56 0.340  5.87  0.318  20.56 
   <0.001    <0.001    0.209    0.015 
                
Canada  0.734  977.39 0.739 15.53 0.741  7.98  0.732  18.37 
   <0.001    0.008    0.092    0.031 
                
Netherlands  0.563  492.31 0.583 25.63 0.597 16.83  0.555  9.02 
   <0.001    <0.001    0.002    0.435 
                
Switzerland  0.448  234.31 0.465 15.59 0.471 10.34  0.451  18.17 
   <0.001    0.008    0.035    0.033 
                
Italy  0.493  285.04 0.504 15.12 0.500  3.33  0.483  6.555 
   <0.001    0.010    0.504    0.683 
                 
Table 2b 
Summary Statistics from OLS Regressions of US Investors’ Gross Sales  
of Foreign Equities on Different Information Sets 
 
The table presents summary statistics from OLS regressions of gross sales of foreign equities by US investors on 
four information sets: (A) six lagged values of the gross sales; (B) lagged sales plus the global instruments; (C) 
lagged sales plus global and local instruments; and (D) lagged sales plus lagged squared residuals from a vector 
autoregression of the US excess stock return, the foreign country excess stock return and the change in the 
exchange rate. The global instruments are detailed in Table 1b while the local instruments are detailed in Table 
2a. The 
2 R  statistics are adjusted for degrees of freedom. The value of the chi-squared test statistic associated 
with the Wald test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the explanatory variables are jointly equal to 
zero is shown in the column (χ
2) along with its asymptotic marginal significance level (P-value). In some of the 
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lagged flows + 
global + local 
instruments 
(D)  
lagged flows + 
squared residuals 
  



























   P-value  P-value  P-value  P-value 
           
           
Germany  0.852 1540.57  0.854 12.84 0.859 23.44 0.851 13.14 
    <0.001   0.025   <0.001   0.156 
           
Japan 0.945  2592.18  0.945  4.87  0.945  6.11  0.946  18.23 
   <0.001   0.432  0.191  0.033 
           
UK 0.953  4983.23  0.953  9.39  0.953  6.89  0.954  23.93 
   <0.001   0.095  0.142  0.004 
           
France 0.289  164.57  0.315  19.82  0.311  7.26  0.287  24.00 
   <0.001   0.001  0.123  0.004 
           
Canada 0.780  1162.60  0.779  10.49  0.782  9.55  0.776  8.46 
   <0.001   0.063  0.049  0.488 
           
Netherlands 0.644 708.51  0.664 20.21 0.677 15.03 0.639 11.10 
   <0.001   0.001  0.005  0.269 
           
Switzerland 0.303 113.52  0.311  9.58  0.320 11.10 0.299 25.63 
   <0.001   0.088  0.025  0.002 
           
Italy 0.434  205.21  0.448  10.47  0.447  4.60  0.422  8.23 
   <0.001   0.063  0.331  0.511 
            
Table 2c 
Summary Statistics from OLS Regressions of US Investor’s Net Purchases  
of Foreign Equities on Different Information Sets 
 
The table presents summary statistics from OLS regressions of net purchases of foreign equities by US investors 
on four information sets: (A) six lagged values of the net purchases; (B) lagged net purchases plus the global 
instruments; (C) lagged net purchases plus global and local instruments; and (D) lagged net purchases plus 
lagged squared residuals from a vector autoregression of the US excess stock return, the foreign country excess 
stock return and the change in the exchange rate. The global instruments are detailed in Table 1b while the local 
instruments are detailed in Table 2a.  The 
2 R  statistics are adjusted for degrees of freedom. The value of the chi-
squared test statistic associated with the Wald test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the explanatory 
variables are jointly equal to zero is shown in the column (χ
2) along with its asymptotic marginal significance 
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lagged flows + 
global + local 
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(D)  
lagged flows + 
squared residuals 
  



























   P-value  P-value  P-value  P-value 
           
           
Germany  0.117    49.43  0.119  7.19  0.130 10.20 0.130 28.96 
     <0.001   0.207  0.037  0.001 
           
Japan  0.310 178.42  0.311  6.76  0.305 2.374 0.307  9.44 
   <0.001   0.239  0.667  0.398 
           
UK  0.166  59.25 0.187 17.74 0.201 10.89 0.180 30.67 
   <0.001   0.003  0.028   <0.001 
           
France 0.135  32.24  0.174  19.53  0.171  3.10  0.136  17.96 
   <0.001   0.002  0.541  0.036 
           
Canada 0.195  72.06  0.218  16.27  0.229  6.96  0.186  10.33 
   <0.001   0.006  0.138  0.325 
           
Netherlands 0.164  85.03 0.181 12.28 0.204 18.14 0.157 14.77 
   <0.001   0.031  0.001  0.098 
           
Switzerland 0.086  17.35 0.105 14.52 0.112 10.28 0.104 21.47 
    0.008  0.013  0.036  0.011 
           
Italy 0.015  9.45  0.010  5.03  0.009  5.62  -0.002  9.866 
    0.150  0.412  0.229  0.361 
            
Table 3 
Variance Ratios and Specification Tests of Net Flow Regressions 
 
The table presents two numbers to compare two ways to model expected net flows. The first number in each cell 
(var. ratio) shows the ratio of the variance of the expected net flow series constructed by the two methods. In the 
numerator, the expected net flow is obtained from a regression of the net flows on the given instrument set, as in 
Table 2c. In the denominator, the expected portion of the gross flows regressions from Tables 2a and 2b are used 
to construct an implied expected net flow. A number below 1.00 indicates that we obtain more explanatory power 
for net flows by using the expected gross flows to construct an expected net flow rather than by using the net 
flow in a regression directly. The second number in each cell (P-value) is the marginal significance level of a χ
2  
test statistic from a regression of the net flows on the lagged gross purchases and sales. The test is that the 
coefficients on the lagged gross purchases are equal and opposite in value to the coefficients on the lagged gross 
sales. A small value indicates significantly different time series dynamics for the gross purchases and sales.  
 
          
   Instrument  Set 
        






















Country       
       
       
Germany  var.  ratio  0.306 0.387 0.461 0.365 
  P-value  0.319 0.338 0.068 0.379 
       
Japan  var.  ratio  0.567 0.614 0.642 0.591 
  P-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
       
UK  var.  ratio  0.382 0.468 0.514 0.440 
  P-value  0.052 0.186 0.037 0.116 
       
France  var.  ratio  0.624 0.738 0.771 0.668 
  P-value  <0.001  0.743 0.559 0.176 
       
Canada  var.  ratio  0.391 0.462 0.543 0.416 
  P-value  <0.001  0.123 0.015 0.006 
       
Netherlands  var.  ratio  0.459 0.873 0.929 0.490 
  P-value  0.527 0.934 0.442 0.446 
       
Switzerland  var.  ratio  0.337 0.494 0.568 0.440 
  P-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
       
Italy  var.  ratio  0.158 0.291 0.357 0.207 
  P-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
       
        
Table 4 
Factor Analysis of Broad Measures of Private Information  
in International Portfolio Equity Flows 
 
The table presents results of a factor analysis on the residuals from the gross flows regressions using 
beginning-of-month values of instrument set C (lagged flows, plus global and local instruments) 
shown in Tables 2a and 2b. The first column presents the cumulative variance of residuals explained 
by the first three factors obtained from an iterated principal factor analysis. The second column 
presents a chi-squared test statistic that the covariance matrix does not display a factor structure 
against an alternative one factor representation. The third column presents a chi-squared test statistic 
that the covariance matrix contains more than one factor. The latter two tests are obtained from a 
maximum likelihood analysis and are presented along with their marginal significance levels (P-
values). 
 
      








  Cumulative  χ
2(7)  χ
2(14) 
Factor Variance  (%)  P-value  P-value 
     
Gross Purchases    
1 0.526  105.74  32.87 
2 0.743  <0.001  0.003 
3 0.854     
      
      
Gross Sales     
1 0.553  80.32  14.14 
2 0.748  <0.001  0.439 
3 0.857     
     
      
Table 5 
Summary Statistics of Regressions of International Excess Equity Returns 
on Global Instruments, Local Instruments, and Lagged Equity Flows 
 
The table shows summary statistics from OLS regressions of the excess equity returns on US and foreign stocks 
on two instrument sets: (i) the set of global instruments shown in Table 1b; and (ii) the global and local 
instruments. The 
2 R  statistics are adjusted for degrees of freedom. The value of the chi-squared test statistic 
associated with the Wald test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the explanatory variables are jointly 
equal to zero is shown in the column (χ
2) along with its asymptotic marginal significance level (P-value). 
 
      
  (i) Global instruments  (ii) Global plus local 
instruments 
  





2 R  
 
χ
2 (4) for 
local 
Country   P-value    P-value 
      
US  0.019 9.301 0.018 0.815 
   0.054  0.665 
      
Germany  0.038 14.654 0.046  5.868 
   0.005  0.209 
      
Japan  0.032 13.455 0.030  4.873 
   0.009  0.301 
      
UK  0.016 6.451 0.037 8.104 
   0.168  0.088 
      
France  0.028 7.044 0.018 0.649 
   0.134  0.957 
      
Canada  0.022 6.162 0.016 3.408 
   0.187  0.492 
      
Netherlands  0.041 10.603 0.052  4.919 
   0.031  0.296 
      
Switzerland  0.065 18.727 0.055  0.657 
   0.001  0.957 
      
Italy  -0.003 3.128 -0.013 1.246 
   0.537  0.870 
      
      
  
Table 6a 
Coefficients on the Global Instruments in the One Latent Factor  
Model of International Stock Returns 
 
The table shows the αH coefficients on the global instruments in the latent factor model of international stock 
returns. The global instruments are a constant, the US short-term interest rate (rt-1
US ), the US credit spread 
(crspt-1
US ), the dividend yield on the global equity market (divt-1
all), the slope of the US term structure (slt-1
US) 
and the excess returns on US stocks (rst-1
US). The model is estimated separately by Generalized Method of 
Moments for each holding period of H months. The beta coefficient on the US stock return is normalized to 
1.00 for identification. The small-sample adjusted version of the Newey-West standard errors (s.e.) are 
calculated assuming an overlap of H+3 terms in the error process.  The small-sample adjustment follows the 
procedure outlined in Ferson and Foerster (1994). The small-sample marginal significance levels (P-values) 
are shown below the standard errors.   
 
         
  αH  coefficient in latent variable model 






Holding  (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) 
period  P-value  P-value  P-value  P-value  P-value  P-value 
        
H = 0  0.006 -1.401 -7.905 4.805 -0.347 0.066 
  (0.004) (0.810) (4.259) (2.372) (0.817) (0.032) 
  0.117 0.085 0.064 0.044 0.671 0.037 
        
H = 1 0.039  -3.612  -38.642  13.864  -6.948  -0.006 
  (0.013)  (1.731) (12.215) (5.033)  (2.766)  (0.029) 
  0.002 0.038 0.002 0.006 0.013 0.841 
        
H = 2 0.009  7.280  -88.045  16.024  9.597  -0.103 
  (0.011)  (2.080) (16.134) (7.184)  (3.524)  (0.038) 
  0.419  0.001 <0.001 0.026  0.007  0.007 
        
H = 3  0.014 12.340  -113.657  7.848 16.036 -0.030 
  (0.013)  (2.616) (20.586) (6.881)  (3.305)  (0.043) 
  0.263 <0.001  <0.001 0.255 <0.001 0.488 
        
        
  
Table 6b 
Coefficients on the Implied Global Risk Premium in the One Latent Factor  
Model of International Stock Returns 
 
The table shows the βH coefficients on the implied global risk premium in the one latent factor model of 
international stock returns. The implied global risk premium is the linear combination of the instruments given in 
Table 6a. The beta coefficient on the US stock return is normalized to 1.00 for identification. The model is 
estimated separately for each holding period of H months by Generalized Method of Moments. The small-sample 
adjusted version of the Newey-West standard errors (s.e.) are calculated assuming an overlap of H+3 terms in the 
error process. The small-sample marginal significance levels (P-values) are shown below the standard errors. The 
small-sample adjustment follows the procedure outlined in Ferson and Foerster (1994).    
 
   
 Holding  period 
       
  H = 0  H = 1  H = 2  H = 3 
  β  β  β  β 
  (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) 
Country  P-value  P-value  P-value  P-value 
      
      
US  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
      
Germany  2.107 1.248 1.096 1.152 
  (0.878) (0.326) (0.187) (0.187) 
  0.017  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
      
Japan 1.880  -0.127  -0.277  -0.735 
  (1.106) (0.406) (0.262) (0.277) 
  0.090 0.755 0.292 0.008 
      
UK  1.646 1.114 0.681 0.740 
  (0.589) (0.234) (0.148) (0.145) 
  0.006  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
      
France  2.557 1.952 0.812 0.829 
  (1.158) (0.486) (0.238) (0.193) 
  0.028 <0.001 0.001 <0.001 
      
Canada  1.966 1.230 0.183 0.179 
  (0.599) (0.223) (0.153) (0.165) 
 0.001  <0.001  0.233  0.277 
      
Netherlands  2.076 1.395 1.074 1.113 
  (0.726) (0.251) (0.138) (0.131) 
  0.005  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
      
Switzerland  3.388 1.681 1.492 1.237 
  (1.467) (0.378) (0.229) (0.190) 
  0.022  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
      
Italy  1.845 1.638 0.031 0.200 
  (0.991) (0.415) (0.249) (0.255) 
 0.063  <0.001  0.902  0.434 
      
  
Table 6c 
Summary Statistics of the One Latent Factor Model of International Stock Returns 
 
The top part of the table presents variance ratio measures of the statistical fit of the latent factor model. The ratio 
shows how the latent factor model without any private information captures the expected return variation in the 
data. The numerator is the variance of the expected return from the latent factor model while the denominator is 
the variance of the expected return from an OLS regression of the return on the global instruments. The bottom 
part of the table presents the value of the J-statistic associated with the Wald test of over-identifying restrictions 
of the model. The statistics are distributed as χ
2(40) and are presented along with their small-sample marginal 
significance levels (P-value).  
 
   
 Holding  period 
       
Country  H = 0  H = 1  H = 2  H = 3 
      
Variance  ratios     
      
US  0.320 1.384 1.924 2.132 
Germany  0.581 0.641 0.874 0.943 
Japan  0.140 0.003 0.026 0.174 
UK  0.765 0.867 0.375 0.447 
France  0.710 1.047 0.243 0.230 
Canada  0.446 0.791 0.030 0.030 
Netherlands  0.789 1.541 1.210 1.308 
Switzerland  1.751 1.271 1.490 0.996 
Italy  0.339 0.790 0.000 0.023 
      
J-statistic  model  test     
      
χ
2(40)   19.498 25.272 22.617 21.576 
P-value 0.997 0.966 0.986 0.992 
      
       
 Table 7 
Joint Significance Tests of the Effects of the Broad and Conservative Measures of the  
Global Factor in Private Information on International Stock Returns 
 
The table shows the values of the chi-squared test statistics associated with the Wald tests of the null hypothesis 
that all of the γH  ( H γ ~ ) coefficients on the broad (conservative) private information measures are jointly equal to 
zero. In the first part of the table, the tests are for the joint significance of the broad measures of the global factor 
in private information of US investors across the equity returns in the U.S. and the eight foreign countries that are 
presented in Table 8a. In the second part of the table, the tests are for the joint significance of the conservative 
measure of the global factor in the private information of US investors across the equity returns of the same 
countries (Table 8b). The statistics are χ
2(9) distributed and obtained from a Generalized Method of Moments 
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Broad  measure     
      
H = 0  19.603 20.118 21.652 23.727 
  0.021 0.017 0.010 0.005 
      
H = 1  38.198 30.931 34.387 43.331 
 <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 
      
H = 2  24.776 25.254 29.010 28.472 
  0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 
      
H = 3  48.636 46.821 54.439 42.921 
 <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 
      
      
      
Conservative  measure    
      
H = 0   13.482  13.559  17.887 
    0.142 0.139 0.037 
      
H = 1   26.999  28.124  35.823 
   0.001  0.001  <0.001 
      
H = 2   19.175  24.995  25.892 
    0.024 0.003 0.002 
      
H = 3   30.706  30.214  38.728 
   <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 
       
 Table 8a 
Coefficients on the Broad Measure of the Global Factor in  
Private Information in International Equity Markets 
The table shows the γH coefficients on the broad measures of the global factor in private information of US 
investors in the cross section of international stock returns. The coefficients are estimated separately for each 
holding period of H months but jointly across the equity returns of all of the foreign countries as in equation (4) 
by Generalized Method of Moments. The αH and βH coefficients are fixed at the values presented in Tables 6a 
and 6b. The small-sample adjusted version of the Newey-West standard errors (s.e.) are calculated assuming an 
overlap of H+3 terms in the error process.  The small-sample marginal significance levels (P-values) are shown 
below the standard errors. The values of the chi-squared test statistics associated with the Wald tests of the null 
hypothesis that all of the γ coefficients on the private information measures are jointly equal to zero are shown at 
the bottom of the table along with their small-sample marginal significance levels (P-values).  
   
      
  H = 0  H = 1  H = 2  H = 3 
  γ 0  γ 1  γ 2  γ 3 
  (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) 
Country  P-value  P-value  P-value  P-value 
      
US 7.426  7.986  10.029  9.392 
  (2.420) (3.232) (3.233) (3.508) 
  0.002 0.014 0.002 0.008 
      
Germany 5.549  0.324  8.586  12.565 
  (3.648) (4.120) (4.289) (4.087) 
  0.129 0.937 0.046 0.002 
      
Japan  5.994 9.384 3.003 1.616 
  (4.508) (5.178) (5.630) (6.071) 
  0.185 0.071 0.594 0.790 
      
UK 8.523  6.769  10.409  6.954 
  (3.026) (3.828) (3.648) (4.042) 
  0.005 0.078 0.005 0.086 
      
France  10.010  2.676 2.863 1.982 
  (3.419) (4.180) (4.119) (4.909) 
  0.004 0.522 0.487 0.687 
      
Canada 8.256  9.223  5.635  12.074 
  (2.659) (3.296) (3.034) (3.946) 
  0.002 0.005 0.064 0.002 
      
Netherlands  8.910 7.914 8.904 7.311 
  (2.714) (3.545) (3.323) (3.874) 
  0.001 0.026 0.008 0.060 
      
Switzerland  6.222 -2.184 4.934 7.319 
  (2.847) (4.065) (4.065) (4.454) 
  0.030 0.592 0.226 0.101 
      
Italy 9.011  4.951  11.860  21.743 
  (4.122) (5.056) (4.851) (5.830) 
 0.030  0.328  0.015  <0.001 
Joint significance test       
χ
2(9)   21.653 34.387 29.010 54.439 
P-value 0.010 <0.001 0.001 <0.001 
      
  
Table 8b 
Coefficients on the Conservative Measure of the Global Factor in  
Private Information in International Equity Markets 
The table shows the  H γ ~  coefficients on the conservative measures of the global factor in private information of 
US investors in the cross section of international stock returns. The coefficients are estimated separately for each 
holding period of H months but jointly across the equity returns of all of the foreign countries as in equation (4) 
by Generalized Method of Moments. The αH and βH coefficients are fixed at the values presented in Tables 6a 
and 6b. The small-sample adjusted version of the Newey-West standard errors (s.e.) are calculated assuming an 
overlap of H+3 terms in the error process.  The small-sample marginal significance levels (P-values) are shown 
below the standard errors. The values of the chi-squared test statistics associated with the Wald tests of the null 
hypothesis that all of the  H γ ~
 coefficients on the private information measures are jointly equal to zero are shown 
at the bottom of the table along with their small-sample marginal significance levels (P-values). 
   
      
  H = 0  H = 1  H = 2  H = 3 
  γ 0  γ 1  γ 2  γ 3 
  (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) 
Country  P-value  P-value  P-value  P-value 
      
US -1.297  -1.019  3.770  4.567 
  (2.050) (2.797) (2.559) (3.350) 
  0.527 0.716 0.142 0.174 
      
Germany -4.026  -6.780  2.244  6.960 
  (3.236) (3.898) (3.645) (3.944) 
  0.214 0.083 0.539 0.079 
      
Japan -0.069  3.313  -0.008  0.006 
  (4.542) (5.587) (5.933) (6.194) 
  0.988 0.554 0.999 0.999 
      
UK  0.743 -2.892 4.889 3.079 
  (2.703) (3.735) (3.206) (4.020) 
  0.784 0.439 0.128 0.444 
      
France  -0.484 -4.429 -3.042 -3.995 
  (3.244) (4.077) (3.698) (4.358) 
  0.882 0.278 0.411 0.360 
      
Canada  -1.994 -2.151 -2.486 5.209 
  (2.384) (3.490) (2.769) (3.922) 
  0.404 0.538 0.370 0.185 
      
Netherlands  0.413 0.286 4.113 3.384 
  (2.339) (3.305) (2.739) (3.674) 
  0.860 0.931 0.134 0.358 
      
Switzerland -0.878  -8.041  1.388  5.191 
  (2.728) (3.909) (3.478) (4.221) 
  0.748 0.041 0.690 0.220 
      
Italy -1.193  -1.007  4.478  12.569 
  (4.017) (4.935) (4.457) (5.398) 
  0.767 0.838 0.316 0.021 
Joint significance test       
χ
2(9)   13.559 28.124 24.996 30.214 
P-value 0.139 0.001 0.003 <0.001 
       
Table 9 
Variance Ratio Statistics of Global Factor in Private Information 
 in International Equity Markets 
 
The numerator is the (absolute value of ) the γH  and   H γ ~ coefficients from Tables 8a and 
8b, respectively, multiplied by the standard deviation of the corresponding measure of 
private information ( t Υ and t Υ ~
, respectively). The denominator is the standard deviation 
of the realized excess stock return in the country.   
 
       
       
Country  H = 0  H = 1  H = 2  H = 3 
      
Broad  measure     
      
US  0.160 0.120 0.126 0.103 
Germany  0.091 0.004 0.083 0.105 
Japan  0.088 0.093 0.024 0.011 
UK  0.152 0.087 0.114 0.069 
France  0.147 0.027 0.024 0.014 
Canada  0.150 0.115 0.058 0.108 
Netherlands  0.175 0.113 0.106 0.076 
Switzerland  0.116 0.028 0.051 0.064 
Italy  0.117 0.044 0.087 0.134 
      
Conservative measure     
      
US  0.029 0.016 0.049 0.052 
Germany  0.068 0.082 0.022 0.060 
Japan  0.001 0.034 0.000 0.000 
UK  0.014 0.038 0.055 0.031 
France  0.007 0.047 0.027 0.030 
Canada  0.037 0.028 0.026 0.048 
Netherlands  0.008 0.004 0.050 0.036 
Switzerland  0.017 0.106 0.015 0.047 
Italy  0.016 0.009 0.034 0.080 
      
      
 
 